P.Rai wrote:Thanks for the answer Jake. I want to respond, but I'm taking the LSAT in a week, which also happens to be finals week here in LA, so no can do right now. I do, however, promise to get back to this ASAP. Meanwhile, perhaps you can clarify some things for me.
What does it mean to compare two advocacies? Does that mean we compare which one is more true? What is an advocacy anyway? Is it an argument in favor of an action? If this is the case, are we judging which argument is more true? Or are we judging which argument is more persuasive (i.e., which action we would rather take, given the two arguments in play)? What metric do we determine which advocacy is more persuasive (is it which argument is more true, or is it something else)? How do we determine what advocacies we allow people to take up?
Comparing two advocacies means choosing between two options—the affirmative and negative advocacy, although perhaps negatives may claim the right to defend multiple advocacies. How this choice is made is subject to in-round debate. I don’t see how an advocacy can be “more true” than another advocacy (although it is possible for an advocacy to be “more truthful” than another advocacy—for example, telling the truth versus spreading a lie), and, no, an advocacy is not “an argument in favor of an action.”
In the technical sense, arguments are not advocacies, and advocacies are not arguments; we make arguments to justify our advocacy. Usually, an advocacy is a course of action, although that is not the only type of advocacy. In general, an advocacy is a proposal, support, recommendation, endorsement, whatever term you want to use, of a particular cause. This cause may be a world, policy, philosophy, interest, theory, or mindset; the possibilities are pretty vast, only restricted by two demands in the debate round: (1) that it be prescriptive, and (2) that it be compared to a competitive advocacy. Other constraints, such as topicality, are matters of theory debate within this paradigm. You ask about a metric for comparison: as I have said, that metric is subject to in-round debate (which is a major role for philosophy), but this paradigm would default to a utility calculus because that is the most basic method of comparison between two options—which option is better?
P.Rai wrote:On the issue of philosophy/politics/truth: is it not just as much an assumption to say that the theory/praxis distinction is a bad idea as it is to say that it is a good one? Does O/D eliminate the possibility for one to question whether "stakes" are relevant? Finally, I think you misunderstand deontology if you think a deontologist would "weigh" the "impact" of violating a side constraint against utilitarian concerns. Deontology rejects this approach to ethics altogether. A deontologist would not say, to use your example, that an absolute side constraint against torture is good because it produces X benefit. Rather, A deontologist would say that an absolute side constraint against torture is necessary to remain consistent with a moral maxim, that is, that treating someone as a means to an end is immoral. To force a deontologist to compare the violation of a side constraint to some consequentalist impact is to PRESUPPOSE consequentalism. You are excluding the deontologist before the comparison between deontology and consequentalism even begins.
To clarify, I only stated my personal belief that the theory/praxis distinction is bad; that is not an assumption of the O/D paradigm. I was agreeing with you that philosophy and policy are interconnected, and expressing that O/D allows for a wide range of advocacies within its basic constraints. No, O/D does not eliminate the possibility for one to question whether “stakes” are relevant, but that argument would never a round-winner, nor should it be. That’s a pretty horrible argument: “It is not important to prove that your argument is important.” If you really can’t answer the question, “What is at stake?” then there is no reason why we should care. Can you prove otherwise?
You say, “A deontologist would say that an absolute side constraint against torture is necessary to remain consistent with a moral maxim, that is, that treating someone as a means to an end is immoral.” That’s fine. I do not demand that “the violation of a side constraint” present a consequentialist impact, but that morality be compared to a consequentialist impact; you acknowledge this. Comparing the importance of moral law to a consequentialist effect does not presuppose consequentialism; it forces you to debate against consequentialism to win that comparison. You even refer to “the comparison between deontology and consequentialism,” which is exactly what I’m talking about. The point is is, you have to prove that it is more important to be moral than it is to maximize utility, if the deontologist is correct that morality and utility are distinct. You have to prove that it is better to choose an advocacy that does not entail torture over an advocacy that does entail torture, because morality is more important than the speculative, amoral, utilitarian benefits of torture. Any good ethicist can explain the stakes here, why morality is important, and compare it to other values.
The moral of the story is this: If LD is values debate, why can’t we compare values?
P.Rai wrote:
Your claim that a violation of a side constraint is irrelevant if it occurs on both sides also seems to side with the notion that O/D eliminates deontology. Deontology would say that both actions are immoral, And if an action is immoral, certainly you would agree that it has some relevance to a resolution that uses the word "ought," right?
Yes, if an action is immoral, then that probably has some relevance to a resolution that uses the word “ought.” This does not mean that we have a final answer, that we do not need to compare which advocacy is more consistent with the principles of morality. Your approach is still stuck in the TT logic, that the negative only needs to prove that we “ought not” do X, that the affirmative violates one itsy bitsy, necessary but insufficient burden.
Also, if both actions violate a side constraint, then that harm is non-unique. Are you really encouraging debaters to go for non-unique impacts? That makes debate pretty stupid, and it makes morality pretty stupid, because it removes any basis for making decisions if we say, “No,” to everything. If your conception of morality requires X, and we will always violate X (i.e. violations of X are inevitable or non-unique), that does not mean that we are always immoral; it just means that your conception of morality sucks and cannot guide conduct. Why should we care about a morality that condemns us all to hell regardless of our choices?
P.Rai wrote:
Additionally, your claim that the elimination of deontology does not render debate incoherent is not responsive. I do not presuppose that consequentalism vs. deontology is comprehensive of philosophy. Refer to my post on the other thread (it is the second to last post, I believe) for why several other key branches of philosophy play no role in O/D. These include Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Language, and Philosophy of Mind. To put it in context, almost nothing that anyone in my philosophy department works on would play a role in O/D. This holds true for many other well regarded programs in the U.S. as well. Like I alluded to earlier, the ONLY philosophy for which O/D makes room is critical theory, which in my opinion, is not philosophy. It is political theory. But that is an opinion of mine, which I force no one to hold. Run your Ks, but do not eliminate other philosophy simply because there is K ground. It is with this in mind that I used the words "boiled down" and "incoherent," and I stand by those words. My point is not that K ground is bad, but rather that K ground is NOT ENOUGH.
If none of the professors in your philosophy department work on anything relevant to O/D, then that just means they do not work on issues that are important to human choices. You really think these philosophers of Science, Language, and Mind can’t explain the impact of their studies? If you asked your professors, “Why is this important?” do you really think they’d respond, “It’s not.” Do you really not have ethicists at UCLA, or philosophy professors concerned with human conduct and choices? Do your professors really confine themselves to exclusively descriptive claims in their research? If you answered, “Yes,” to these questions, then I ask, “Why should we care if you can’t run these arguments?” Explain to me why this ground matters, and why we should care if you lose it. And if you answered, “No,” then there is a role for those branches of philosophy in O/D.
If a given branch of philosophy has a role in making decisions and choosing between competing options, then it has a role in O/D. Gimme a break (of that Kit-Kat Bar): this list is certainly not confined to critical theory. I’m going to copy/paste from page 3 of this thread, just to hammer the point:
“Here’s the bottom line, and I want you to read this closely because I mean every word of it: If you believe there is a serious case for a given moral theory in making decisions, that moral theory has a place in O/D. If you believe that justice, morality, and ethics (hell, let’s even throw in some meta-ethics) are important—-and not just a cool way to win a meaningless quibble—-then they have a role in O/D. If you believe that we should strive for virtue, live a life of moral rightness, and learn from value debate, then your philosophy has a front-row seat in O/D. If you believe that Rawlsian conceptions of justice and a well-ordered society or Kantian notions of moral freedom and rationality can serve as guiding principles for action, then they can guide a ballot in O/D. This is because those issues have a strong say in making decisions and choosing between competing options. Should we turn the trolley? Should we harvest the innocent man’s organs? Should we torture the suspect in the face of a ticking bomb? Should we tax the rich? Should we prosecute atrocities in an international court? Philosophers have a lot to say about these issues.”
So, here's my question to you, Prashant: Why should we care? Explain why the philosophy ground you lose is important, why it is good ground you should have, and why the importance of that ground loss outweighs the other harms of TT. See, even competing interpretations is just a theory form of O/D; it all fits together after the Revolution.