Did truth testing die?

To help clarify Jake's point on the util/deon discussion, he's saying that in the same way discussions between competing ethical theories rely on some external metric to determine which theory is preferable (be it via practicality, consistency, etc). In the same way that under util debaters have to do meta-weighing (ie why does the judge vote for the extinction impact with a low probability over the thermonuclear war that is likely to happen), or theory debaters (as jake alluded to) have to weigh between theory standards (ground vs predictability, etc); under any Comparativist paradigm, in order to win a deont argument you need to prove why we should consider side constraints prior to pragmatic concerns (or just read something like nozick and say the rights violation is actually a really bad impact). And like Jake said, if you really are that into deont, you should know the util v deon debate well enough that it shouldn't be an issue.

hmmm, interesting. i'll have to think about it and get back to you. you may have persuaded me.

prashant

P.Rai wrote:hmmm, interesting. i'll have to think about it and get back to you. you may have persuaded me.

prashant

This feels a little bit like Ali conceding to Frazier. Just when an epic discussion was getting good!

no i thought about it and i still disagree. no time right now for the full response though. ill be back soon.

prashant

Wow, I missed a lot in this thread. I'll try to jump in and continue the discussion, but since these posts are reaching massive sizes, I'll respond to arguments in a general fashion and in a random order.

AT Jake's "Explain to me why (Language/Science/Mind) philosophies matter"

The problem with this is that it attempts to project a specific subjective calculus in deciding whether these philosophies matter or not. In the series of questions you posed you say "Do your professors really confine themselves to exclusively descriptive claims in their research?" which seems to imply descriptive philosophy has no worth, or at least only if it is prescriptive. Though I am of the Foucauldian belief that knowledge is never neutral, I think that the form descriptive philosophies take shouldn't be arbitrarily deemed irrelevant solely because it doesn't create tangible impacts. Again, the implication I'm trying to draw from this discussion is that the paradigm distinctions are purely subjective, and even from a theoretical perspective, it is ok to choose either one, that outside concerns, like competing for novices with CX, would be the external factors in determining one paradigm over another. "Importance" is a vague concept, with many varying meanings. I think that trying to resolve the discussion of the "importance" of descriptive philosophies in one internet discussion is futile (without, of course, making bad links to utilitarian impacts like extinction), however we can determine which paradigm makes these fields relevant regardless of the answer to that question, and that is truth testing. This being a subjective issue (as I see it) I would think that if a large group of people enjoy discussing descriptive philosophies without tying them to specific impacts, and that there already exists an option very similar to the alternative available, it seems net beneficial to let truth testers truth tester, and for comparavists to join policy.

However, I know such an answer is insufficient to reconcile the entire issue, so I will press onward.

AT: "We still compare philosophies and value systems in CW"

Two major points

1, To compare between philosophies like Util and Deont, external standards for weighing are needed. Usually those can cover a wide variety of criteria ranging from "Whether this philosophy coheres with human behavior better" to "Can the value of specific actions be determined before the action itself is initiated". More often than not, however, these discussions will either be very decisive or very muddled. Coming from personal experience, I've seen the latter more than the former (Here is where you make a joke about my debate style being muddled). It seems that things like contingent standards are able to check for that kind of outcome and make the debate more decisive when this happens. Now, it seems that, Jake, your primary reason for not liking TT is the reliance on spikes in the framework. I am personally fine with it and I'm sure many are as well, but it seems like these kinds of discussions almost always need spikes and tricks to be able to resolve. How do you justify deontology without trying to justify it from a utilitarian perspective when the CW paradigm presumes the utilitarian calculus? Maybe my understanding of your argument is not that good, and clarification would help, but it seems like framework-style arguments are almost always needed to win a framework comparison debate.

2, More specifically on the debate between deont/util as value metrics, why do we default to body-count util? Saying that humans have worth is a very contestable claim and util assumes we have the ability to predict events in the future (which we don't). Deontology may still suffer from the first complication, but at least we have a better gauge for assessing worth of particular actions given that the assessment of value comes prior and during the action rather than after.

I'll add more and respond to more later, but as a side note, this discussion has been really intriguing. I'm glad that there is a better place to discuss these things on the internet now.

Alex Bennett wrote:Wow, I missed a lot in this thread. I'll try to jump in and continue the discussion, but since these posts are reaching massive sizes, I'll respond to arguments in a general fashion and in a random order.

AT Jake's "Explain to me why (Language/Science/Mind) philosophies matter"

The problem with this is that it attempts to project a specific subjective calculus in deciding whether these philosophies matter or not. In the series of questions you posed you say "Do your professors really confine themselves to exclusively descriptive claims in their research?" which seems to imply descriptive philosophy has no worth, or at least only if it is prescriptive. Though I am of the Foucauldian belief that knowledge is never neutral, I think that the form descriptive philosophies take shouldn't be arbitrarily deemed irrelevant solely because it doesn't create tangible impacts. Again, the implication I'm trying to draw from this discussion is that the paradigm distinctions are purely subjective, and even from a theoretical perspective, it is ok to choose either one, that outside concerns, like competing for novices with CX, would be the external factors in determining one paradigm over another. "Importance" is a vague concept, with many varying meanings. I think that trying to resolve the discussion of the "importance" of descriptive philosophies in one internet discussion is futile (without, of course, making bad links to utilitarian impacts like extinction), however we can determine which paradigm makes these fields relevant regardless of the answer to that question, and that is truth testing. This being a subjective issue (as I see it) I would think that if a large group of people enjoy discussing descriptive philosophies without tying them to specific impacts, and that there already exists an option very similar to the alternative available, it seems net beneficial to let truth testers truth tester, and for comparavists to join policy.

1. Jake and others have said about a million times that even if novices had any fucking clue what you mean if you explained paradigms to them right away, they still wouldn't care.

2. Weighing doesn't have to be utilitarian, but more on this later. Jake's point (and i agree) is that if your philosophy matters enough that academics would honestly consider it in the process of discussing the topic at hand, there has to be some reason why. All you have to is identify what this rationale is (in policy it's normally root cause arguments that people use for this - ie by subscribing to a paradigm where science/whatever is accepted on face, you fail to address the real rationale for xyz problems). If you honestly feel that a philosophy is that important that it JUSTIFIES a truth-testing paradigm, there has to exist a reason why, and chances are that reason is why your philosophy matters in some comparativist paradigm.

3. Please go back and read the reasons people have provided for why Comparativist LD is distinct from policy. There has been a lot of discussion on this point and if you're just going to assert that we have to worry about this, there's no point in discussing this. One unique reason i can think of is that LD is still young enough that we have an opportunity to make a distinction even in a comparativist framework. The way in which we use comparative worlds can be different from that of policy (which is still evolving). My point is that worrying about LD collapsing is unfounded. Here in MN, most judges ascribe to a CW paradigm and we have a very strong circuit in both LD and Policy. It's possible for both to exist even with comparative debate.

1, To compare between philosophies like Util and Deont, external standards for weighing are needed. Usually those can cover a wide variety of criteria ranging from "Whether this philosophy coheres with human behavior better" to "Can the value of specific actions be determined before the action itself is initiated". More often than not, however, these discussions will either be very decisive or very muddled. Coming from personal experience, I've seen the latter more than the former (Here is where you make a joke about my debate style being muddled). It seems that things like contingent standards are able to check for that kind of outcome and make the debate more decisive when this happens. Now, it seems that, Jake, your primary reason for not liking TT is the reliance on spikes in the framework. I am personally fine with it and I'm sure many are as well, but it seems like these kinds of discussions almost always need spikes and tricks to be able to resolve. How do you justify deontology without trying to justify it from a utilitarian perspective when the CW paradigm presumes the utilitarian calculus? Maybe my understanding of your argument is not that good, and clarification would help, but it seems like framework-style arguments are almost always needed to win a framework comparison debate.

First off, the CW paradigm doesn't presume util. Util is a MORAL paradigm for how we make decisions about actions. It is distinct from an offense/defense paradigm like how most judges evaluate T and Theory. Additionally, standards like consistency, practicality, agent-contingent issues (what moral paradigm does the state use?), etc are how you would resolve the debate over Util and Deon. Util =/= all comparative paradigms.

Second, you can spin Deon impacts in terms of Util. Authors like Nozick (or on the Jan/Feb Topic, Keith Whittington) argue that to not treat side constraints as such is dangerous and can cause horrific impacts. The arg that deon collapses into Util is somewhat true, but it doesn't mean that you evaluate deon impacts the same way as you would any other impact. This is what Jake is trying to get at (or at least i think) - Deontology states that there exists a set of actions that for reasons that aren't typically apart of the normal util calculus that "outweigh" other impacts. This isn't exactly what they say (someone like Kant would say that duty defines morality so things independent of our olbigations do not have moral characteristics, and other deon authors would argue that the notion of comparing these things to other impacts is absurd) but in a debate context this is the easiest way to explain this.

Third, the fact that there exists bad debate is not really a disad to any particular paradigm. One could also say that LDers abuse a priori args to the point where it is a pain to resolve. That's not really a reason TT is bad, that's just a reason some debaters abuse TT.

Fourth, Jake's argument is that the "framework" debate should occur at a case level so one is weighing all claims against each other instead of saying "xyz impacts are the most important, disregard everything else" that can be a result of the way people use the v/c structure now.

Why do we default to body-count util? Saying that humans have worth is a very contestable claim and util assumes we have the ability to predict events in the future (which we don't). Deontology may still suffer from the first complication, but at least we have a better gauge for assessing worth of particular actions given that the assessment of value comes prior and during the action rather than after.

That's a fair question, and one that can be argued in the round. However, Util =/= all comparisons. Util is a moral paradigm. Bentham and Mills and Rawls didn't write their works explaining why we should compare theory standards or whatever, they're talking about morality. Comparativist framework exists outside of Util.

I guess in most cases, we are dealing with a state actor. The state primarily uses a Util framework (although things like the constitution have usually been at least a roadblock to a range of potential actions). Rober Goodin has an entire book on this, but his argument is that there are a set of results (wellbeing, survival, etc) that the state considers good. However, ensuring this result for everyone is A) impossible and B) even if it wasn't impossible, it'd be a horrible idea to do for a number of reasons (mainly the amount of resources one would use). Therefore, the state should seek to maximize these results because it is the closest we can realistically get to the ideal. I've only read what i can via google books of it but it's pretty interesting.

poneill wrote:1. Jake and others have said about a million times that even if novices had any fucking clue what you mean if you explained paradigms to them right away, they still wouldn't care.

Fine. I will concede this because that chain of arguments is going nowhere. It just seems like if LD becomes comparative, there won't be that much significant difference between the activity and that we should aim to establish our identity as unique from policy. I know you'll point to your 3rd point as a response to this so lets keep this discussion on that 3rd point then.

poneill wrote:2. Weighing doesn't have to be utilitarian, but more on this later. Jake's point (and i agree) is that if your philosophy matters enough that academics would honestly consider it in the process of discussing the topic at hand, there has to be some reason why. All you have to is identify what this rationale is (in policy it's normally root cause arguments that people use for this - ie by subscribing to a paradigm where science/whatever is accepted on face, you fail to address the real rationale for xyz problems). If you honestly feel that a philosophy is that important that it JUSTIFIES a truth-testing paradigm, there has to exist a reason why, and chances are that reason is why your philosophy matters in some comparativist paradigm.

Linguistic philosophies are widely studied and they don't prevent nuclear war or genocide. The "reason" for why they're important is usually hard to find given that these types of philosophies are descriptive in nature. Loaded into these posts is the idea that unless the philosophy can't produce a tangible impact, then its not important. Linguistic philosophies, I think and I'm sure many others agree, are interesting but can hardly be used in the way CW demands without having tenuous links. No, I will not be able to prove good linguistics is key to fixing the economy, but I still think descriptive philosophies bring a lot of strategic nuances to the debate itself. As P.Rai said, K ground is not enough, and to conceptualize these philosophies in the way you propose would only collapse them into critical style cases (How could one run the argument "Democracy is exclusionary and evil, thus they would disenfranchise felons" in a CW paradigm?).

Additionally, it seems that linguistic philosophy can pretty much justify any type of comparativist position within a TT paradigm, however the opposite is not true. I've run plenty of CPs, DAs, etc. through a TT paradigm with good success. It seems TT is somewhat subsumtive of CW, and if one techs out the interpretive level of debate, it seems that one can win on almost any comparativist voting issue, even though it is impossible to win on TT voting issues in a CW paradigm.

poneill wrote:3. Please go back and read the reasons people have provided for why Comparativist LD is distinct from policy. There has been a lot of discussion on this point and if you're just going to assert that we have to worry about this, there's no point in discussing this. One unique reason i can think of is that LD is still young enough that we have an opportunity to make a distinction even in a comparativist framework. The way in which we use comparative worlds can be different from that of policy (which is still evolving). My point is that worrying about LD collapsing is unfounded. Here in MN, most judges ascribe to a CW paradigm and we have a very strong circuit in both LD and Policy. It's possible for both to exist even with comparative debate.

OK, let me list all the distinctions provide not only in this thread, but in the other one as well:

1.) 1v1 format (Not substantive enough to be the sole reason)
2.) Generally less evidence work (I don't know why this would be a reason why we are better than policy except for people with lower expectations for what they should get out of debate for their work ethic)
3.) Topics more narrowly defined (This is something we can't rely on forever. Many people (Not specifically anyone in this thread) have encouraged restructuring resolutions to better fit a comparativist paradigm ie using words like "should", specing the actors in the resolve rather than make a vague claim about their identity etc. Even if we keep the original format, however, I don't think we would be limited by a more narrow topic. Debaters are able to find links to anything in any topic, meaning this distinction is irrelevant practically)
4.) CX references squo for impacts, CW LD can reference the hypothetical (You mentioned this in the other thread. This is a legitimate distinction, however this doesn't create that much of a significant distinction. Many will likely reference the squo as it is easier, and even then, references to hypothetical impacts won't change the round massively enough to make it distinguishable from a standard CX round)

I don't think these advantages are why many CW proponents joined LD and now are trying to reform it rather than just joining policy beforehand. My sole argument wasn't that novices will defer to policy; I also argued that a policy-esque LD will leave hypotesting fans out in the cold even though there exists a more favorable option for the comparativists in joining CX. I discussed with you in the other thread and you mentioned that you would've probably liked to have done policy rather than LD, which begs the question; why the hell didn't comparavists just jump ship and join policy rather than go on a reform crusade to impose one subjective paradigm over another (We haven't resolved whether one paradigm is superior to another, so at least in context with this discussion, the issue is subjective)?

First off, the CW paradigm doesn't presume util. Util is a MORAL paradigm for how we make decisions about actions. It is distinct from an offense/defense paradigm like how most judges evaluate T and Theory. Additionally, standards like consistency, practicality, agent-contingent issues (what moral paradigm does the state use?), etc are how you would resolve the debate over Util and Deon. Util =/= all comparative paradigms.

The "Util" part of "Body-count Util" is a ethical metric, not an ethical theory. Measure the weight of actions based on their results. It gives so calculus for the determination of what is or isn't valuable ie Util can be applied differently for those that think life is good and for those that think life is bad. Positive actions for both sides still operate under a utilitarian basis. A deontological metric is entirely different. I would argue that a Util "metric" presumption follows a CW paradigm, and this is seemingly implied explicitly and implicitly by most of the defendants of CW here. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems like impacts comparison entails an ends based weighing system, and thus the all the problems that come with arbitrarily presuming one metric over another.

Second, you can spin Deon impacts in terms of Util. Authors like Nozick (or on the Jan/Feb Topic, Keith Whittington) argue that to not treat side constraints as such is dangerous and can cause horrific impacts. The arg that deon collapses into Util is somewhat true, but it doesn't mean that you evaluate deon impacts the same way as you would any other impact. This is what Jake is trying to get at (or at least i think) - Deontology states that there exists a set of actions that for reasons that aren't typically apart of the normal util calculus that "outweigh" other impacts. This isn't exactly what they say (someone like Kant would say that duty defines morality so things independent of our olbigations do not have moral characteristics, and other deon authors would argue that the notion of comparing these things to other impacts is absurd) but in a debate context this is the easiest way to explain this.

Third, the fact that there exists bad debate is not really a disad to any particular paradigm. One could also say that LDers abuse a priori args to the point where it is a pain to resolve. That's not really a reason TT is bad, that's just a reason some debaters abuse TT.

Fourth, Jake's argument is that the "framework" debate should occur at a case level so one is weighing all claims against each other instead of saying "xyz impacts are the most important, disregard everything else" that can be a result of the way people use the v/c structure now.

If deontology generally has to collapse into Util to be strategic (given the likelihood of util presumption and that, as you say, deontology must exist in some linear weighing spectrum when the literature would say otherwise) then what is the point to running deontology? It would be extra work with no extra pay off. The only way to decidedly win these debates is through fw args, usually through spikes/tricks etc. The implication is thus then that those running deontology will rely on fw spikes and tricky shit. You somewhat respond to this in the 3rd response, however, if the primary reason for me preferring CW over TT is that it gets rid of shitty fw debate, then the 3rd response kinda concedes that CW doesn't really do anything significant to fix it. In the same response you belittle the problem of a prioris, which implies that we shouldn't worry about them as much as has been stressed in this thread and the other.

I'm somewhat confused on the 4th point. How does the CW guarantee that fw debates happen at the case level? And how can that structural change not be formatted into TT?

That's a fair question, and one that can be argued in the round. However, Util =/= all comparisons. Util is a moral paradigm. Bentham and Mills and Rawls didn't write their works explaining why we should compare theory standards or whatever, they're talking about morality. Comparativist framework exists outside of Util.

I guess in most cases, we are dealing with a state actor. The state primarily uses a Util framework (although things like the constitution have usually been at least a roadblock to a range of potential actions). Rober Goodin has an entire book on this, but his argument is that there are a set of results (wellbeing, survival, etc) that the state considers good. However, ensuring this result for everyone is A) impossible and B) even if it wasn't impossible, it'd be a horrible idea to do for a number of reasons (mainly the amount of resources one would use). Therefore, the state should seek to maximize these results because it is the closest we can realistically get to the ideal. I've only read what i can via google books of it but it's pretty interesting.

It seems though that despite our decent ability to predict the outcome of events, we are genuinely myopic about determining which course of action is better than another. I can understand why the state prefers util, but I confused why deontology isn't more commonly preferred given that the value in actions can be determined immediately while in util it can't.

Alex Bennett wrote:
Linguistic philosophies are widely studied and they don't prevent nuclear war or genocide. The "reason" for why they're important is usually hard to find given that these types of philosophies are descriptive in nature. Loaded into these posts is the idea that unless the philosophy can't produce a tangible impact, then its not important. Linguistic philosophies, I think and I'm sure many others agree, are interesting but can hardly be used in the way CW demands without having tenuous links. No, I will not be able to prove good linguistics is key to fixing the economy, but I still think descriptive philosophies bring a lot of strategic nuances to the debate itself. As P.Rai said, K ground is not enough, and to conceptualize these philosophies in the way you propose would only collapse them into critical style cases (How could one run the argument "Democracy is exclusionary and evil, thus they would disenfranchise felons" in a CW paradigm?).

Additionally, it seems that linguistic philosophy can pretty much justify any type of comparativist position within a TT paradigm, however the opposite is not true. I've run plenty of CPs, DAs, etc. through a TT paradigm with good success. It seems TT is somewhat subsumtive of CW, and if one techs out the interpretive level of debate, it seems that one can win on almost any comparativist voting issue, even though it is impossible to win on TT voting issues in a CW paradigm.

1. in terms of your question, I actually did this a couple of times. Zizek talks about how the democratic system only functions when there is someone who is excluded blahblahblah. I thought it was a dumb arg even under TT, but that's besides the point.

2. To take a step out, my position is that if we were not debaters but in fact academics debating this very question, and whatever philosophy you talk about has merit when discussing said subject (ie you have a topical or specific discursive link), there's a reason why. This reason is not only why your philosophy matters in terms of the discussion but could also matter in terms of debate. READ MY POST AGAIN, IF YOUR PHILSOPHY IS WORTH A DAMN, THERE'S A REASON WHY. THAT REASON IS WHY IT MATTERS IN A CW PARADIGM. You conflate impacts (ie nuke war) with meta-weighing and more framework (in a policy sense of the word) style debate (ie significance of a particular field of study to a topic). If there's no reason why one should include linquistic considerations when making a decision of any type (even if it's just, 'is this statement true') relevant to the topic, I'd argue that it's shitty ground to begin with. Simply put, you have to justify why the ground you lose matters. What VALUE does descriptive philosophy provide in debate? (I'm not saying it doesn't, but you aren't really stating why it does).

3. Once again, "impact" implies something like nuke war, whereas I'm saying, even in TT, things have value (ie when deciding the truth of a statement, xyz factors are the most important things to consider). In order for something to matter in a comparativist paradigm, one simply has to establish that one would consider said thing in their decision about the topic. It ain't that hard. Hell, at a minimum, shit like equality or internal consistency or dehum or whatever are vauge enough to give you an impact for these things.

I don't think these advantages are why many CW proponents joined LD and now are trying to reform it rather than just joining policy beforehand. My sole argument wasn't that novices will defer to policy; I also argued that a policy-esque LD will leave hypotesting fans out in the cold even though there exists a more favorable option for the comparativists in joining CX. I discussed with you in the other thread and you mentioned that you would've probably liked to have done policy rather than LD, which begs the question; why the hell didn't comparavists just jump ship and join policy rather than go on a reform crusade to impose one subjective paradigm over another (We haven't resolved whether one paradigm is superior to another, so at least in context with this discussion, the issue is subjective)?

I'm going to leave this whole issue of jumping ship alone now but i have two final remarks:

1. I'm sure Theis would agree both that Minnesota is generally closer to a CW paradigm than a TT paradigm (although if we assume for a sec that these paradigms are like the political spectrum, and states are like the political parties, most states are fairly close to the middle), and that Minnesota has a pretty Vibrant circuit. There are weekends where there are no circuit tournaments and there are two tournaments in the cities that both have a good attendance rate. Minnesota also has a good Policy circuit. I say this because i feel like minnesota is a good example of how there's not going to be this massive decline in numbers because of a paradigm shift.

2. I'll admit that the disucssion is somewhat subjective. However, that's the reason we have this discussion.

The "Util" part of "Body-count Util" is a ethical metric, not an ethical theory. Measure the weight of actions based on their results. It gives so calculus for the determination of what is or isn't valuable ie Util can be applied differently for those that think life is good and for those that think life is bad. Positive actions for both sides still operate under a utilitarian basis. A deontological metric is entirely different. I would argue that a Util "metric" presumption follows a CW paradigm, and this is seemingly implied explicitly and implicitly by most of the defendants of CW here. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems like impacts comparison entails an ends based weighing system, and thus the all the problems that come with arbitrarily presuming one metric over another.

1. sorry i was kinda rushed and didn't make it extremely clear. However, Util is ethics. Util = Bentham, Rawls, Mills, which generally concerns pleasure. Consequentialism = evaluating impacts. Util is a subset of Consequentialism. What you're referring to is Consequentialism.

2 You kinda hit on the reason this isn't an issue - It only says that you adopt whichever side is better. You still can determine what you think matters in this paradigm.

If deontology generally has to collapse into Util to be strategic (given the likelihood of util presumption and that, as you say, deontology must exist in some linear weighing spectrum when the literature would say otherwise) then what is the point to running deontology? It would be extra work with no extra pay off. The only way to decidedly win these debates is through fw args, usually through spikes/tricks etc. The implication is thus then that those running deontology will rely on fw spikes and tricky shit. You somewhat respond to this in the 3rd response, however, if the primary reason for me preferring CW over TT is that it gets rid of shitty fw debate, then the 3rd response kinda concedes that CW doesn't really do anything significant to fix it. In the same response you belittle the problem of a prioris, which implies that we shouldn't worry about them as much as has been stressed in this thread and the other.

1. It's not "tricky shit" to say "rights violations are the worst thing juuudge, Nozick sayz sing along if you know the words "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do..."

2. Deont authors such as Nozick say that things like rights come prior to Util consideration. That's the deont argument that is supported by more contemporary authors. One can therefore say that in terms of a debate argument, deontology sayz that xyz are the most important impacts. That's not that hard, and basically is just rewording the same side-constraint argument that most people make. I brought up the "deont collapses into util" in order to provide another example of the argument.

3. Kinda a caveat to 1, but the distinction is that weighing/linking deon into util would be more than "rez is tautology, apriori affirm" (i get that the 5 world a priori is not a great arg under any paradigm but you get my point). Plus, is it really that hard to explain why deont is important/valuable? (you seem to have already done this below)

I'm somewhat confused on the 4th point. How does the CW guarantee that fw debates happen at the case level? And how can that structural change not be formatted into TT?

Nebel's argument is that instead of having framework at the top, people weigh impacts under O/D as a means of replacing it. It wouldn't really work in TT because without prior framework, "x leads to extinction" doesn't have a clear descriptive impact. I'm still thinking as to whether this is true or not and if so whether it is desirable, but I just wanted to clarify the point

It seems though that despite our decent ability to predict the outcome of events, we are genuinely myopic about determining which course of action is better than another. I can understand why the state prefers util, but I confused why deontology isn't more commonly preferred given that the value in actions can be determined immediately while in util it can't.

That's a fair question. I'll try and figure out how to answer it later when i'm not as tired. For now, though, the reason most of the time the neg has to prove why deont matters is because the aff adopts a util fw in the AC so the burden of proof shifts neg at that point to explain why deon matters (and it also depends on what type of util and deon you're talking about).

poneill wrote:
2. To take a step out, my position is that if we were not debaters but in fact academics debating this very question, and whatever philosophy you talk about has merit when discussing said subject (ie you have a topical or specific discursive link), there's a reason why. This reason is not only why your philosophy matters in terms of the discussion but could also matter in terms of debate. READ MY POST AGAIN, IF YOUR PHILSOPHY IS WORTH A DAMN, THERE'S A REASON WHY. THAT REASON IS WHY IT MATTERS IN A CW PARADIGM. You conflate impacts (ie nuke war) with meta-weighing and more framework (in a policy sense of the word) style debate (ie significance of a particular field of study to a topic). If there's no reason why one should include linquistic considerations when making a decision of any type (even if it's just, 'is this statement true') relevant to the topic, I'd argue that it's shitty ground to begin with. Simply put, you have to justify why the ground you lose matters. What VALUE does descriptive philosophy provide in debate? (I'm not saying it doesn't, but you aren't really stating why it does).

I think a distinction needs to be made; The use of these types of philosophies can be either prescriptive or descriptive. You argue this prescriptive use is how the philosophy is to be used in CW, and I argue that both are legitimate uses and that TT is the only paradigm able to utilize both uses. Correct me if I'm wrong with than clarification, but proceeding from there, in response to the last sentence I would argue that the value of descriptive philosophy is education, as is the value of prescriptive philosophy. Just because prescriptive philosophy is the basis of political movements and shit doesn't mean it has some kind of abstract value over descriptive philosophy. Its based on personal preference I suppose, and TT allows for both uses while CW allows for only one.

3. Once again, "impact" implies something like nuke war, whereas I'm saying, even in TT, things have value (ie when deciding the truth of a statement, xyz factors are the most important things to consider). In order for something to matter in a comparativist paradigm, one simply has to establish that one would consider said thing in their decision about the topic. It ain't that hard. Hell, at a minimum, shit like equality or internal consistency or dehum or whatever are vauge enough to give you an impact for these things.

What I don't understand is why strain certain philosophies to fit this paradigm of argumentation when the advantages of said paradigm are nonexistant within the context of this discussion. It seems this argument was initiated with the claim that CW destroys philosophy ground. The 2 main responses were "No it doesn't" (which is a legitimate argument) and "That ground loss doesn't matter" (Which I argue isn't legitimate). I think we should continue this discussion, but the outcome of this chain of arguements has little bearing on what paradigm we prefer. I don't wanna seem like the topicality police, but lets expand discussion back into the more general TT vs CW discussion (While at the same time still discussing this issue as well).

I'm going to leave this whole issue of jumping ship alone now but i have two final remarks:

1. I'm sure Theis would agree both that Minnesota is generally closer to a CW paradigm than a TT paradigm (although if we assume for a sec that these paradigms are like the political spectrum, and states are like the political parties, most states are fairly close to the middle), and that Minnesota has a pretty Vibrant circuit. There are weekends where there are no circuit tournaments and there are two tournaments in the cities that both have a good attendance rate. Minnesota also has a good Policy circuit. I say this because i feel like minnesota is a good example of how there's not going to be this massive decline in numbers because of a paradigm shift.

2. I'll admit that the disucssion is somewhat subjective. However, that's the reason we have this discussion.

Let me reiterate: I concede that a paradigm shift doesn't entail a drop in attendance. The argument I'm stressing is that certain people like TT, and certain people like CW. Policy most resembles CW and offers a more developed and nuanced option for comparativists than a reformed LD ever could. I could only conjure 4 unique (and frankly, underwhelming) features from this thread and the other that make a CW LD distinct from CX. My point is that it would be more beneficial for these comparativists to join policy and TT to have LD so that more people are happy. Seriously, those who advocate the CW paradigm, if you could go back to being a novice with the info you have now, would you seriously choose LD over policy? It seems like this self-righteous "revolution" for LD probably wouldn't happen if all the comparativists joined policy, given that the issue is subjective.

Also, if the issue is subjective, why do people in this thread keep arguing CW is better than TT?


I'll make a more general response to the util v deont thing later

I'm gonna drop the whole quote thing for the philosophy section because there are two points that i make, and you have yet to actually respond to one of them (and the other you dismiss).

1. All philosophies that matter in terms of the topic debate or in terms of rhetoric/though processes that come from debating the topic matter in CW.

Jake has made this point, as have I, and TT defenders have yet to really respond to it. You say "ks of science and linguistic philosophies are important in debate". My question is why? What value (remember value is something inherent to all viewpoints) do these philosophies have? It doesn't need to be prescriptive, but it needs to be a logical reason why academics would consider it when discussing the topic (pssst Linguistic ks generally have sick root cause impacts that are deadly in CW).

You say "education" is the value to them, and while it's nice, you still have to show A) why this education is good; and B) why it matters in the context of debating. What value does this philosophy provide to debate? If you're a professor of philosophy that writes the K of Science lit and I'm the Dean of your University, tell me why I should continue to pay you. If you cannot explain what unique value for debate these philosophies have, then I would say that ground loss isn't important. Just like in T/Theory debates, you need to establish why the ground you provide is good, I'm asking you to do the same thing. If education is the standard we're evaluating things under (which I'd argue it isn't), tell me what offense you're linking to this standard.

There is a ton of literature that argues that prescriptive discussions provides a unique value for society (Rawls says that discussing government policies/actions fosters civic participation, a guy named Waltz argues that it's critical to ensuring elites don't take over policy discussions in the real world, etc). I know similar lit exists for descriptive theories, you just haven't told me what it says.


2. You can still link your philosophies into CW

There are seriously like a million authors that say that X deontological impact is so morally reprehensible we cannot stand to allow it. Policy debaters make moral obligation arguments (and sometimes win with them if they're good). Deontology is not forbidden in CW, and actually can play a big roll. It just can't always result in a decision for the judge.

As I said, lingusitic arguments generally have some good root cause impacts, and Ks of Science and other descriptive Philosophies provide neat framework (in the policy sense) and no solvency arguments. Descriptive philosophies can and do work in CW.

Let me reiterate: I concede that a paradigm shift doesn't entail a drop in attendance. The argument I'm stressing is that certain people like TT, and certain people like CW. Policy most resembles CW and offers a more developed and nuanced option for comparativists than a reformed LD ever could. I could only conjure 4 unique (and frankly, underwhelming) features from this thread and the other that make a CW LD distinct from CX. My point is that it would be more beneficial for these comparativists to join policy and TT to have LD so that more people are happy. Seriously, those who advocate the CW paradigm, if you could go back to being a novice with the info you have now, would you seriously choose LD over policy? It seems like this self-righteous "revolution" for LD probably wouldn't happen if all the comparativists joined policy, given that the issue is subjective.

LD has always been more focused on philosophical/moral questions. This is equally true in CW as it is in TT. That's a distinction that will always remain the case.

2. LD is not focused on the status quo/issues of inherency don't apply. This opens up a lot more room for neat positions.

I'll think of more later.

Plus, you assume that because the issue is subjective that those who disagree with PART of the community (there are plenty of circuits that use CW as the norm). Imo, that's pretty damned elitist. Just because the issue is subjective doesn't mean that those of us who don't enjoy TT should leave LD and go do policy.

In addition to what Phelan said, if you want to go the route of education, CW wins there too for a few reasons. First, it's obviously more educational to discuss real world impacts than just abstract impacts to "truth" that have no applicability in the real world. Second, you get more education on philosophy with CW because instead of just assuming the applicability of a particular philosophy, you have to justify it yourself. Like Phelan has been saying, you learn why that philosophy matters and why people should consider it in evaluating possible courses of action. Finally, when you weigh impacts directly instead of just excluding tons of relevant impacts through a VC, you can learn how to evaluate impacts that would occur in the real world. Instead of saying that only one type of impact matters, you learn strategies to evaluate competing impacts based on magnitude, probability, timeframe, etc, which is how we make decisions in the real world.

poneill wrote:I'm gonna drop the whole quote thing for the philosophy section because there are two points that i make, and you have yet to actually respond to one of them (and the other you dismiss).

1. All philosophies that matter in terms of the topic debate or in terms of rhetoric/though processes that come from debating the topic matter in CW.

Jake has made this point, as have I, and TT defenders have yet to really respond to it. You say "ks of science and linguistic philosophies are important in debate". My question is why? What value (remember value is something inherent to all viewpoints) do these philosophies have? It doesn't need to be prescriptive, but it needs to be a logical reason why academics would consider it when discussing the topic (pssst Linguistic ks generally have sick root cause impacts that are deadly in CW).

You say "education" is the value to them, and while it's nice, you still have to show A) why this education is good; and B) why it matters in the context of debating. What value does this philosophy provide to debate? If you're a professor of philosophy that writes the K of Science lit and I'm the Dean of your University, tell me why I should continue to pay you. If you cannot explain what unique value for debate these philosophies have, then I would say that ground loss isn't important. Just like in T/Theory debates, you need to establish why the ground you provide is good, I'm asking you to do the same thing. If education is the standard we're evaluating things under (which I'd argue it isn't), tell me what offense you're linking to this standard.

There is a ton of literature that argues that prescriptive discussions provides a unique value for society (Rawls says that discussing government policies/actions fosters civic participation, a guy named Waltz argues that it's critical to ensuring elites don't take over policy discussions in the real world, etc). I know similar lit exists for descriptive theories, you just haven't told me what it says.

If you're hoping I'm going to provide some kind of abstract reason why descriptive philosophy is important independent of a debate context, I'm not going to. I lack the will power and frankly, any standard to justify the value of a particular philosophy in an absolute context is going to be arbitrary, so even in a vacuum, I don't think the value of prescriptive philosophy is apparent (or at least, as apparent as you make it seem)

I will, however, provide you reasons why we preserve descriptive usages of philosophy in a debate context. First, it adds an extra layer of strategy. In TT both prescriptive and descriptive interpretations of philosophies can be used, while in CW only the former can. Since debate is a strategic activity, more ground for strategy seems to be fitting (say what you want, those picky fw args and spikes omnipresent in most TTers' cases require strategic, and tactical, thinking). Secondly, there is educational value. CW deals with a select brand of philosophy, and while that may seem as an argument for depth, given that CW demands longer impact stories, usually these philosophies have to be co-opted with empirical sources. In essence, there is greater educational flexibility in TT given the breadth of philosophies available to you.

You also say education is not the standard we use to evaluate which lit we should allow into the activity. My question is, what is? If its about the long-term applicability of these philosophies, I have my doubts running a "do nothing" plan is going to greatly influence future decision making by me.

2. You can still link your philosophies into CW

There are seriously like a million authors that say that X deontological impact is so morally reprehensible we cannot stand to allow it. Policy debaters make moral obligation arguments (and sometimes win with them if they're good). Deontology is not forbidden in CW, and actually can play a big roll. It just can't always result in a decision for the judge.

As I said, lingusitic arguments generally have some good root cause impacts, and Ks of Science and other descriptive Philosophies provide neat framework (in the policy sense) and no solvency arguments. Descriptive philosophies can and do work in CW.

The first paragraph is irrelevant since deontology is not a descriptive philosophy. Regardless, as I said earlier, trying to weigh moral obligations with extinction is tricky. It requires heavy analysis by the judge of the fw debate, which seems to be counter to the aims of comparatavists.

Explain how they work in framework and solvency arguments. The usage of descriptive philosophy I describe is likely not the one used in those types of arguments, as the usage I describe is uniquely fw oriented and only for hypotesting based interpretations of the resolution (justice/morality as a form etc., which by the way, cannot be run in CW)

LD has always been more focused on philosophical/moral questions. This is equally true in CW as it is in TT. That's a distinction that will always remain the case.

2. LD is not focused on the status quo/issues of inherency don't apply. This opens up a lot more room for neat positions.

I'll think of more later.

Plus, you assume that because the issue is subjective that those who disagree with PART of the community (there are plenty of circuits that use CW as the norm). Imo, that's pretty damned elitist. Just because the issue is subjective doesn't mean that those of us who don't enjoy TT should leave LD and go do policy.

AT 1: Generally, the CW debaters I know like to parametricize their cases and move focus away from the abstract. I know that's a policy-maker v. kritikal debater question, but regardless, policy is seeing more and more K debaters recently making philosophical discussion key to contemporary CX rounds. I don't think we can claim to be the "more philosophically oriented debate" when policy will already be ahead of us when we have this "revolution"

AT 2: This is legit as far as I know (I'm not that well schooled on the nuances of policy), but it still seems insufficient in proving to me we would be different enough.

To the last thing, I would say the best solution would be divided LD into CW and TT just to placate the most vehement on both sides. I personally like the discussion, and I hope if this were to happen (which it likely wont) that CW-esque args can still operate within the TT paradigm as they do today, because I am genuinely interested in things like CPs, DAs, Ks etc. You accuse me of elitism, however, at least if TT keeps it crown there would be an alternative for CWers. If comparativism becomes the norm what will happen to TTers? Should we just pack our bags and say good bye to debate (likely not to happen, but I'm sure many would be pissed). Seriously, how are you, proposing massive shifts to CW and snubbing out TT, any less elitist than me, taking the more conservative route?

[quote="Alex Bennett"]
If you're hoping I'm going to provide some kind of abstract reason why descriptive philosophy is important independent of a debate context, I'm not going to. I lack the will power and frankly, any standard to justify the value of a particular philosophy in an absolute context is going to be arbitrary, so even in a vacuum, I don't think the value of prescriptive philosophy is apparent (or at least, as apparent as you make it seem) [quote]

But it's not arbitrary and the educational value of prescriptive philosophy (i'm talking from an academic standpoint here, not from a debate standpoint) is very clear. I'll even give you a list of sources you can read that discuss the value of this form of roleplaying:

Donald S. Lutz, Professor, Political Science, University of Houston, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K, p. 36-37.
Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor, Human Rights, Harvard University, LESSER EVILS, 2004, p. 20-21.
Rawls, John; The Law of Peoples; Harvard University Press, 1999.
Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K, p. 182-183.
Walt, Stephen; Professor at the University of Chicago, International Studies Quarterly 35.

That's 5 sources that you can track down that support my position in writing. So, once again, I'll ask you the same question Nebel asked earlier: If I were to ask one of the authors why their writing matters, what would they say? What value does your philosophy have in a debate context? How did you justify these args on the Sept/Oct topic? I'm sure if you read these args, you had a reason why they mattered relative to the resolution. Chances are those type of arguments are how you'd link them into a CW paradigm

I will, however, provide you reasons why we preserve descriptive usages of philosophy in a debate context. First, it adds an extra layer of strategy. In TT both prescriptive and descriptive interpretations of philosophies can be used, while in CW only the former can. Since debate is a strategic activity, more ground for strategy seems to be fitting (say what you want, those picky fw args and spikes omnipresent in most TTers' cases require strategic, and tactical, thinking). Secondly, there is educational value. CW deals with a select brand of philosophy, and while that may seem as an argument for depth, given that CW demands longer impact stories, usually these philosophies have to be co-opted with empirical sources. In essence, there is greater educational flexibility in TT given the breadth of philosophies available to you.

1. Empirical sources ain't necessary bud - plenty of K debaters and even just philosophy fans win rounds in CW and in policy without empirics.

2. I'd be more than happy to tell you why CW allows these descriptive philosophies, but you aren't telling me why we should even give a damn about them.

You also say education is not the standard we use to evaluate which lit we should allow into the activity. My question is, what is? If its about the long-term applicability of these philosophies, I have my doubts running a "do nothing" plan is going to greatly influence future decision making by me.

I'm saying that like any other theory standard, education isn't inherently something we should care about in debate. I could go grab my Economics textbook and bring it to every tournament next year and read it out loud, but that'd be silly because it wouldn't be worthwile in a debate context. You need to first justify why the education we gain is a good thing.

The first paragraph is irrelevant since deontology is not a descriptive philosophy. Regardless, as I said earlier, trying to weigh moral obligations with extinction is tricky. It requires heavy analysis by the judge of the fw debate, which seems to be counter to the aims of comparatavists.

What's so hard about evaluating if they win a moral obligation arg or not? It's just like any other argument. If the team making it wins that the moral obligation comes first, you then evaluate whether the relevant debater violates/fulfills the moral obligation. It's the same as any other arg, except you're evaluating the impact debate and then the link debate.

Explain how they work in framework and solvency arguments. The usage of descriptive philosophy I describe is likely not the one used in those types of arguments, as the usage I describe is uniquely fw oriented and only for hypotesting based interpretations of the resolution (justice/morality as a form etc., which by the way, cannot be run in CW)

1. Using impacts as to why failure to adhere to justice/morality is bad

2. Using it to explain the root cause of certain actions

3. See below

If you give me an actual example i can give a better answer.

AT 1: Generally, the CW debaters I know like to parametricize their cases and move focus away from the abstract. I know that's a policy-maker v. kritikal debater question, but regardless, policy is seeing more and more K debaters recently making philosophical discussion key to contemporary CX rounds. I don't think we can claim to be the "more philosophically oriented debate" when policy will already be ahead of us when we have this "revolution"

1. Philosophy isn't limited to discussions of ethics (as you have pointed out). Philosophy exits on the subjects of Government, Democracy, International Relations, gender and sexuality, etc. LDers are always more attracted to these debates, even in a CW paradigm, than say rushing to a nuke war impact scenario. The AC I ran at Harker and NDCA was at least half descriptive IR theory on the hegemonic status of the United States, and what the US should do in response. In rebuttals, my impact extension was ~20 seconds, and I spent ~2 mins dealing with the descriptive stuff and how it shapes prescriptions (see, descriptive philosophies make sense even in a more empirical context).

2. Policy is expanding into philosophical debate, sure, but we've been having those debates since our format has existed. We've even had prescriptive topics that have had philosophical discussion

AT 2: This is legit as far as I know (I'm not that well schooled on the nuances of policy), but it still seems insufficient in proving to me we would be different enough.

True, I was just thinking of benefits and that's what came to my mind.

To the last thing, I would say the best solution would be divided LD into CW and TT just to placate the most vehement on both sides. I personally like the discussion, and I hope if this were to happen (which it likely wont) that CW-esque args can still operate within the TT paradigm as they do today, because I am genuinely interested in things like CPs, DAs, Ks etc. You accuse me of elitism, however, at least if TT keeps it crown there would be an alternative for CWers. If comparativism becomes the norm what will happen to TTers? Should we just pack our bags and say good bye to debate (likely not to happen, but I'm sure many would be pissed). Seriously, how are you, proposing massive shifts to CW and snubbing out TT, any less elitist than me, taking the more conservative route?

My point wasn't that we should all adopt the CW paradigm, but rather that to simply say "we should just stick with TT because this debate isn't very clear yet" is wrong. I just want to continue the expansion of this discussion in whatever form it occurs and not to just stop it because it's "subjective". Sorry if that wasn't clear

poneill wrote:But it's not arbitrary and the educational value of prescriptive philosophy (i'm talking from an academic standpoint here, not from a debate standpoint) is very clear. I'll even give you a list of sources you can read that discuss the value of this form of roleplaying:

Donald S. Lutz, Professor, Political Science, University of Houston, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K, p. 36-37.
Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor, Human Rights, Harvard University, LESSER EVILS, 2004, p. 20-21.
Rawls, John; The Law of Peoples; Harvard University Press, 1999.
Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor, Political Science, Texas A&M University, POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2K, p. 182-183.
Walt, Stephen; Professor at the University of Chicago, International Studies Quarterly 35.

That's 5 sources that you can track down that support my position in writing. So, once again, I'll ask you the same question Nebel asked earlier: If I were to ask one of the authors why their writing matters, what would they say? What value does your philosophy have in a debate context? How did you justify these args on the Sept/Oct topic? I'm sure if you read these args, you had a reason why they mattered relative to the resolution. Chances are those type of arguments are how you'd link them into a CW paradigm

First off, I provided you reasons for why descriptive philosophies matter in a debate context (which for the sake of this conversation should be the primary area for discussion). Those were: extra layer of strategy given that TT can utilize prescriptive and descriptive usages of philosophies, and education, given that, at least in my experience, I see a wider breadth of philosophies and literature while debating TT just because it demands as much. The exact way a TT case forms is not as concrete as one may think, and thus the areas for research are greatly expanded.

Whether descriptive usages of philosophies have academic value is irrelevant in paradigm discussion. Congrats, roleplaying has a lot of proponents. I wasn't contesting the value of prescription, I was arguing that any standard used to say X philosophy has external worth is going to be arbitrary. No, I'm not going to read 5 books about why roleplaying is good, I'll take your word for it, the discussion of this independent academic value to descriptive philosophies is worthless if it doesn't take place in a debate context.

On the final remark, let me elucidate the difference between descriptive philosophies and descriptive usages of philosophies. You seem to conflate the two, saying that descriptive philosophies can be justified in CW via their academic value. However, descriptive usages of philosophies are inherently neutral. Positions that say justice is a form and not a virtue embody what I mean by that, and that cannot be used in CW since there is no impact.

1. Empirical sources ain't necessary bud - plenty of K debaters and even just philosophy fans win rounds in CW and in policy without empirics.

I'm just noting a general trend likely to happen. K debaters will be different, but if this trend becomes the norm, expect LD to go through a "policy-maker" period similar to policy as people adjust to the paradigm.

I'm saying that like any other theory standard, education isn't inherently something we should care about in debate. I could go grab my Economics textbook and bring it to every tournament next year and read it out loud, but that'd be silly because it wouldn't be worthwile in a debate context. You need to first justify why the education we gain is a good thing.

How about from a strategic standpoint? Greater breadth leads to greater strategies. CW style strat can be run in TT. On the flip side, TT args are hard and sometimes impossible to adapt into CW. Philosophical education is generally conducive to realtering our perceptions of the world which is pretty significant.

What's so hard about evaluating if they win a moral obligation arg or not? It's just like any other argument. If the team making it wins that the moral obligation comes first, you then evaluate whether the relevant debater violates/fulfills the moral obligation. It's the same as any other arg, except you're evaluating the impact debate and then the link debate.

CWers say one of the draws to their activity is that it eliminates the fw debate (in the TT sense). However, in order to gain an advantage in a competing moral paradigms debate in the CW world, tricky fw and preempts seem to be the most strategic options, thus negating the advantage CW claims to have.

1. Using impacts as to why failure to adhere to justice/morality is bad

2. Using it to explain the root cause of certain actions

3. See below

If you give me an actual example i can give a better answer.

I referring to the usage of the philosophy as being descriptive, not the actual philosophy itself.

1. Philosophy isn't limited to discussions of ethics (as you have pointed out). Philosophy exits on the subjects of Government, Democracy, International Relations, gender and sexuality, etc. LDers are always more attracted to these debates, even in a CW paradigm, than say rushing to a nuke war impact scenario. The AC I ran at Harker and NDCA was at least half descriptive IR theory on the hegemonic status of the United States, and what the US should do in response. In rebuttals, my impact extension was ~20 seconds, and I spent ~2 mins dealing with the descriptive stuff and how it shapes prescriptions (see, descriptive philosophies make sense even in a more empirical context).

Gender theory, IR, gov etc. are all omnipresent in CX as well. Hell, maybe even more than in LD.

2. Policy is expanding into philosophical debate, sure, but we've been having those debates since our format has existed. We've even had prescriptive topics that have had philosophical discussion

This doesn't disprove the original argument that we would lack salient differences from CX if CW were to become the norm.

My point wasn't that we should all adopt the CW paradigm, but rather that to simply say "we should just stick with TT because this debate isn't very clear yet" is wrong. I just want to continue the expansion of this discussion in whatever form it occurs and not to just stop it because it's "subjective". Sorry if that wasn't clear

Ok. I still think practically the division of LD into 2 events would work for the time being but I don't know if the incentive is there.

Alex Bennett wrote:

First off, I provided you reasons for why descriptive philosophies matter in a debate context (which for the sake of this conversation should be the primary area for discussion). Those were: extra layer of strategy given that TT can utilize prescriptive and descriptive usages of philosophies, and education, given that, at least in my experience, I see a wider breadth of philosophies and literature while debating TT just because it demands as much. The exact way a TT case forms is not as concrete as one may think, and thus the areas for research are greatly expanded.

Whether descriptive usages of philosophies have academic value is irrelevant in paradigm discussion. Congrats, roleplaying has a lot of proponents. I wasn't contesting the value of prescription, I was arguing that any standard used to say X philosophy has external worth is going to be arbitrary. No, I'm not going to read 5 books about why roleplaying is good, I'll take your word for it, the discussion of this independent academic value to descriptive philosophies is worthless if it doesn't take place in a debate context.

On the final remark, let me elucidate the difference between descriptive philosophies and descriptive usages of philosophies. You seem to conflate the two, saying that descriptive philosophies can be justified in CW via their academic value. However, descriptive usages of philosophies are inherently neutral. Positions that say justice is a form and not a virtue embody what I mean by that, and that cannot be used in CW since there is no impact.

How about from a strategic standpoint? Greater breadth leads to greater strategies. CW style strat can be run in TT. On the flip side, TT args are hard and sometimes impossible to adapt into CW. Philosophical education is generally conducive to realtering our perceptions of the world which is pretty significant.

1. How does TT allow for me to make prescriptive arguments without first impacting them in a descriptive manner?

2. What's so good about arguing "justice is a form" ? I get it's another level of strategy, but I've never got why this level of strategy is really that valuable. CW opens up the worlds of risk assessment and parametricized advocacies which provide not only a ton of strategic value but also increase the educational value.

CWers say one of the draws to their activity is that it eliminates the fw debate (in the TT sense). However, in order to gain an advantage in a competing moral paradigms debate in the CW world, tricky fw and preempts seem to be the most strategic options, thus negating the advantage CW claims to have.

I addressed this before. Reading Nozick's famous opening line in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is by no means "tricky". If one was a lowly novice who heard a varsity debater mention Nozick, chances are I would go to one of the two holy research databases for novices: wikipedia and google. If you google "nozick" or "robert nozick" you would see his wikipedia page. If you go there, the first book that's mentioned is Anarchy, State, and Utopia. If you were a really good novice, you'd go find that book online (google books) and then copy down the first paragraph that sounded good in the book (which is that paragraph). It's honestly that simple.

I referring to the usage of the philosophy as being descriptive, not the actual philosophy itself.

Sure but my number 1 (impacts why failure to adhere to this conception of justice or morality is bad) still works. One can descriptively explain the nature of something and then have a prescriptive impact to it.

Gender theory, IR, gov etc. are all omnipresent in CX as well. Hell, maybe even more than in LD.

This doesn't disprove the original argument that we would lack salient differences from CX if CW were to become the norm.

Policy debater sure think so. Even when the topic is prescriptive and under a CW paradigm, the way in which LDers approach the topic is dramatically different. Think of it like the NFL (football) vs the CFL (canadian football). They're the same game, but they're still very distinct. Hell football is a sick example of how the same basic game can exist in a number of different forms within the same general community (there are 3 pro football leagues in north america).

Also, this point was defense to LD not being as philosophically focused in CW as it is in TT.

poneill wrote:
1. How does TT allow for me to make prescriptive arguments without first impacting them in a descriptive manner?

2. What's so good about arguing "justice is a form" ? I get it's another level of strategy, but I've never got why this level of strategy is really that valuable. CW opens up the worlds of risk assessment and parametricized advocacies which provide not only a ton of strategic value but also increase the educational value.

1. Sure, TT does require you to frame the debate in a specific way (unless you and your opponent concede the same fw before the round), however that is, in my mind, significantly better to allow many potential ways to frame the round, given that they at least give lip service to the framework, than have one perception of how the round should be weighed etc. with little room for alternatives. Still, if you so wanted, CW-style debate is very much possible in TT.

2. Well, for one, some would argue things like "justice" and "morality" are not necessarily desirable. For example, the rule based form justice often take could be a reason to argue some negative rule based action is "just" while being "bad". It's also a nifty way to avoid all those skepticism arguments CWers seem to hate. I have ran parametricized advocacies and argued risk assessment in TT debate, and in addition to the educational value, you learn reasons why they are relevant in the discussion of seemingly neutral toned hypothesis.

I addressed this before. Reading Nozick's famous opening line in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is by no means "tricky". If one was a lowly novice who heard a varsity debater mention Nozick, chances are I would go to one of the two holy research databases for novices: wikipedia and google. If you google "nozick" or "robert nozick" you would see his wikipedia page. If you go there, the first book that's mentioned is Anarchy, State, and Utopia. If you were a really good novice, you'd go find that book online (google books) and then copy down the first paragraph that sounded good in the book (which is that paragraph). It's honestly that simple.

Tricky as in "full of spikes" not tricky as in "difficult to understand". If weighing between moral philosophies in CW is as you described, then it seems that spikes and tricks preemptively put in cases like they are in TT are the best way to win those debates before they happen. The implication is twofold, either:

A. We encourage philosophical discussion, which makes CW only a marginal, at best, improvement over TT that doesn't substantively fix anything or,
B. We discourage philosophical discussion, which divorces us from one of the last unique features of LD over CX.

Sure but my number 1 (impacts why failure to adhere to this conception of justice or morality is bad) still works. One can descriptively explain the nature of something and then have a prescriptive impact to it.

But your paradigm necessitates a prescriptive impact. TT doesn't require it.

K, once again, I'm gonna simplify this down because there aren't that many truly unique arguments left.

First, I'm not seeing why TT is immune from the same issue you have with CW. How can I make prescriptive arguments within TT? Your answer is that one needs to frame it in a specific way, which to me means that I can't without changing the form of the argument. Additionally, one can make descriptive and prescriptive arguments naturally in a CW paradigm - the nature of something impacts the way in which the prescriptive section of the debate plays out (think of it as like philosophical uniqueness). In fact, with your discussion of the Justice/Morality arguments, I'd say they make more sense in a CW paradigm - assuming the resolution supplies us with the evaluative fw (ie justice or morality), you've in essence impact turned the entire resolution so that neg arguments flow aff and vice versa.

Second, how the hell does a parametricized aff affirm a TT rez? That's generally fallacious, no? Even with framework, you've basically just FWed out of a TT paradigm. I'm not sure how the standard TT paradigm allows for debaters to make CW arguments without shifting the paradigm.

Third, how often do you see debaters win debates about ethics/morality on the basis of out-teching their opponent? To me, at least, one isn't going to win a debate about morality based on the quantity of arguments because when the judge ends up resolving the debate, they'll see that only one of the two positions is actually developed. My point is that ethics generally requires a higher threshold for warrants than other arguments.

Additionally, you still ignore what I'm saying. Taking the opening paragraph out of a nozick book ain't spikes. Spikes = shitty unwarranted pre-empts. Also, I have yet to see someone not only run some super-techy moral fw with dozens of arguments, but then do the same thing at a case level. In that case, you just beat whichever section they under-covered the most. It's just like any other part of debate.

And yes, running args that justify your moral paradigm in the first speech is a good idea. I don't give a damn whether you do LD, Policy, PF, Congress, Extemp, Parli, College LD, are having a discussion outside of debate as a formal competitive activity, or are writing a fucking essay for school - justifying the assumptions your position makes is always a good idea. Even if they are analytical, this doesn't make them "spikes" (or if they are then this is an impact turn to the so-called "spikes), it just means the debater(s) chose not to read evidence on the subject. This is good - it means there should actually be clash in the debate if a fw debate is necessary.

poneill wrote:K, once again, I'm gonna simplify this down because there aren't that many truly unique arguments left.

First, I'm not seeing why TT is immune from the same issue you have with CW. How can I make prescriptive arguments within TT? Your answer is that one needs to frame it in a specific way, which to me means that I can't without changing the form of the argument. Additionally, one can make descriptive and prescriptive arguments naturally in a CW paradigm - the nature of something impacts the way in which the prescriptive section of the debate plays out (think of it as like philosophical uniqueness). In fact, with your discussion of the Justice/Morality arguments, I'd say they make more sense in a CW paradigm - assuming the resolution supplies us with the evaluative fw (ie justice or morality), you've in essence impact turned the entire resolution so that neg arguments flow aff and vice versa.

First off, there is a significant difference. The framing of those arguments in TT do not alter the actual substance of which. Prescriptive arguments function the same regardless of paradigm. Just because you pay lip service to why the round ought be comparative doesn't mean you won't have the same impact structure and same substance. However, to frame arguments like "M is not a virtue, rather here is why X thing is M" or "M does not exist, thus X is not M" in CW require tenuous links to impacts, which contradict the usage and substance of the arguments in the first place. If you can tell me how to run purely descriptive arguments without impacts in CW and still be viable then you would be correct, there is no difference between TT and CW in this regard, however I think that isn't really something that could work in CW.

Second, how the hell does a parametricized aff affirm a TT rez? That's generally fallacious, no? Even with framework, you've basically just FWed out of a TT paradigm. I'm not sure how the standard TT paradigm allows for debaters to make CW arguments without shifting the paradigm.

The standard TT paradigm isn't categorical. In fact, the goal of TT is to eliminate certain assumptions like that. If someone criticizes you for running a parametric case, question the grounds for rejecting the paradigm on face. Sure, there does exist a bias for absolute burdens in TT but that is not a unique issue with the paradigm itself. There should be no problem with running "US should join the ICC" in TT and even if FW is absolutely needed, its not hard to link in your parametricized advocacy most of the time (ICC is the best example etc.)

Third, how often do you see debaters win debates about ethics/morality on the basis of out-teching their opponent? To me, at least, one isn't going to win a debate about morality based on the quantity of arguments because when the judge ends up resolving the debate, they'll see that only one of the two positions is actually developed. My point is that ethics generally requires a higher threshold for warrants than other arguments.

There is a few ways to out-tech them: Embedding contingent standards which can be guised by positionality, have prewritten preempts to whatever philosophy they could possibly run already in the framework, preempting the various ways in which the two ethical theories could interact and how one could make the most out of it. I'm not arguing these types of arguments are bad, in fact in a lot of ways this develops the ethical debate significantly when one has to consider how one's fw will hold up against the myriad of possible alternative fws. Its just that fw heavy debate is abhorred in CW apparently, yet the best way to resolve competing ethical discussions is through fw. More than likely most CW debaters will concede util and storm onward.

Additionally, you still ignore what I'm saying. Taking the opening paragraph out of a nozick book ain't spikes. Spikes = shitty unwarranted pre-empts. Also, I have yet to see someone not only run some super-techy moral fw with dozens of arguments, but then do the same thing at a case level. In that case, you just beat whichever section they under-covered the most. It's just like any other part of debate.

Spikes aren't always shitty, and can be used effectively. And despite your cynical perspective on fw heavy debaters, I've seen quite a few debaters balance the effort put in to fw args with the effort put into case level args. Though I primarily like to debate fw, I know that you can fuck up if you don't put the same attention to detail in the case args as well (what if they concede your fw, then what?).

Although I am in agreement that this back and forth hasn't evolved. We can continue this but wider areas of discussion should be considered.

Howabout, what practical solutions can be made to reconcile this issue short term and long term? Or maybe, what structural things would be necessary if this debate were to be resolved? Also, what types of resolutions would be needed for a radical shift to CW?

It's really amazing that this thread is still alive. Absolutely ridiculous.

JohnnyFontane wrote:It's really amazing that this thread is still alive. Absolutely ridiculous.

Its really only me and poniell at this point. Regardless, I do enjoy this discussion, and I am glad someone as bored/obsessed as I would be willing to engage me in this back and forth.

I have a couple comments and at least one question on the current discussion before i engage the new questions you've posed:

1. Assuming a standard TT paradigm, and framework where the aff has the burden to show that the resolution is more true than false, and the neg has the opposite burden, how does say a Disad function? From what I understand, one would have to essentially fw out of a TT paradigm for CW args to work. In this regard, both styles work in the other, they're just one step removed.

2. Lets take a potential topic, say disarm. If my "Plan" is "The US should take all necessary steps to completely disarm by x year," how does this affirm in a TT paradigm? (I get this is only borderline topical, but it's the only way I can illustrate what i'm trying to get it).

3. You answer your own point partially on the topic of tech fw. However, I'd say that this type of framework isn't what CW advocates take issue with. What the objection is is that the totalizing nature of value/criterion frameworks. What Nebel has advocated and what I agree with is that when doing impact calc, excluding one criterion/standard on the basis that the other one had a stronger link to the topic/value/metastandard/whatever. In this case, a debate over ethical frameworks is actually productive, imo, because it encourages debaters to add another layer of warrants to their claim.

4. To delineate, for me, spikes = shitty unwarranted blippy whining. Pre-empts = the same argument but warranted and substantial and not whiney. Sorry about that not being clear. Pre-empts are cool/smart provided they're done well (my ac on jan/feb had like 5 cards of varying length as a pre-empt underview. I never read more than 2 of them, but depending on what i knew about the judge/oppoent, I would add/subtract from my ac with ease and then add/remove the necessary preempts to make it fit in time. Especially on the aff, it's nice because if they run a strat you preempt, you essentially have read a card against their strat already when the 1ar starts. Spikes are lame and not warranted.


In terms of your new questions:

1. I think that judges should be up front about how they evaluate the round. Saying CW or TT is insufficient because what that means varies from person to person. The whole "we ought act as if x was true" thing seems strange to me, and there's even more questions that we could delve into just within CW. Another question especially relevant in CW that I think sometimes is overlooked is pragmatic impacts (ie nuke war, econ collapse, etc) vs philosophical impacts (no value to life, dehum, rights, etc).

The only way the debate can be resolved is through continued discussion in multiple forms. Be bold and run TT bad/CW bad theory once in a while. When the debate starts playing out in rounds is when we start to see a decline in the practice. For instance, when people started running "multiple a prioris bad" theory, there was a decline in the number of a prioris run. a

I think what would help a shift to CW would be larger topics (a la Intl Courts where the whole theoretical court/ICC/ICJ/Regional Court/other misc courts). Also the use of the word ought is generally useful for CW topics. The first factor especially can help prevent the debates from becoming repetitive (although it might be that I'm just a big fan of bigger topics).

poneill wrote:I have a couple comments and at least one question on the current discussion before i engage the new questions you've posed:

1. Assuming a standard TT paradigm, and framework where the aff has the burden to show that the resolution is more true than false, and the neg has the opposite burden, how does say a Disad function? From what I understand, one would have to essentially fw out of a TT paradigm for CW args to work. In this regard, both styles work in the other, they're just one step removed.

Right I'm conceding that certain arguments from both paradigms can be run within eachother, however, the way those CW args function in TT is significantly better than how TT args would function in CW.

1.) CW args like disads maintain their substance when functioning under a TT paradigm. There is still uniqueness, internal link etc., the only caveat is that there has to be some framework justification for why that affirms (and there can be a myriad of those for each topic). One could even just use theory to justify the entire CW paradigm within the TT paradigm potentially. On the other side, TT args within CW must have impacts, which may even substantively contradict with the arguments being made (skepticism, non-prescriptive reading of morality etc.). Since fw doesn't do anything to alter the substance of your argument (rather, it opens up breathing room significantly) I would contend TT co-opts CW args better than CW co-opts TT args.

2.) TT is closer to the ideal "tabula rasa" judging paradigm than CW because of this aforementioned breathing room. The only rule is that it be justified with some kind of framework analysis, while there is many more strings attached when running non-traditional policy arguments in CW.

In regards to how one could run disads in TT it could work one of many ways. You could argue that a term in the resolution implies a more comparative discussion (ie "ought" implies a hierarchy in which one action is preferred over all others. It seems very easy, then, to argue more comparatively). Theory can also be used to outline why a CW fw is better as well (shouldn't be hard, given that many argue TT is theoretically fucked up)

2. Lets take a potential topic, say disarm. If my "Plan" is "The US should take all necessary steps to completely disarm by x year," how does this affirm in a TT paradigm? (I get this is only borderline topical, but it's the only way I can illustrate what i'm trying to get it).

You could list reasons why parametricizing the topic is good (like "US is the best actor to represent a nuclear superpower in context with the rez" or "By X year something will need to be done else we face Y impact. Y impact is bad, so we 'ought' disarm nukes). This is just off the top of my head. TT doesn't imply a categorical burden.

3. You answer your own point partially on the topic of tech fw. However, I'd say that this type of framework isn't what CW advocates take issue with. What the objection is is that the totalizing nature of value/criterion frameworks. What Nebel has advocated and what I agree with is that when doing impact calc, excluding one criterion/standard on the basis that the other one had a stronger link to the topic/value/metastandard/whatever. In this case, a debate over ethical frameworks is actually productive, imo, because it encourages debaters to add another layer of warrants to their claim.

We can't assume people will have similar metastandards, given that that could just push discussion to a different level and not solve anything. I agree contemporarily fw is being treated sloppily, and I don't have that many ideas to remedy the problem (disclosure of cases could help), however, I don't think the paradigm itself should be discredited for this. The question for me is, despite community norms, what checks for rabid fw whoring in CW?

4. To delineate, for me, spikes = shitty unwarranted blippy whining. Pre-empts = the same argument but warranted and substantial and not whiney. Sorry about that not being clear. Pre-empts are cool/smart provided they're done well (my ac on jan/feb had like 5 cards of varying length as a pre-empt underview. I never read more than 2 of them, but depending on what i knew about the judge/oppoent, I would add/subtract from my ac with ease and then add/remove the necessary preempts to make it fit in time. Especially on the aff, it's nice because if they run a strat you preempt, you essentially have read a card against their strat already when the 1ar starts. Spikes are lame and not warranted.

Hrmmm, I've never heard this delineation used before. I always conflate the two. Oh well, to each his own.

1. I think that judges should be up front about how they evaluate the round. Saying CW or TT is insufficient because what that means varies from person to person. The whole "we ought act as if x was true" thing seems strange to me, and there's even more questions that we could delve into just within CW. Another question especially relevant in CW that I think sometimes is overlooked is pragmatic impacts (ie nuke war, econ collapse, etc) vs philosophical impacts (no value to life, dehum, rights, etc).

Right, it seems that (as far as I know) that impasse between theory and praxis hasn't been resolved in CW/policy debating communities (Isn't praxis biased generally?)

The only way the debate can be resolved is through continued discussion in multiple forms. Be bold and run TT bad/CW bad theory once in a while. When the debate starts playing out in rounds is when we start to see a decline in the practice. For instance, when people started running "multiple a prioris bad" theory, there was a decline in the number of a prioris run.

Theory is a powerful tool, which is why I don't see any reason to reject Moerner's solution earlier on in the thread to curtail bad TT practices with theory.

I think what would help a shift to CW would be larger topics (a la Intl Courts where the whole theoretical court/ICC/ICJ/Regional Court/other misc courts). Also the use of the word ought is generally useful for CW topics. The first factor especially can help prevent the debates from becoming repetitive (although it might be that I'm just a big fan of bigger topics).

I think we can both agree there is too many topics per year. They should shave it down to 1 or 2.

Just a couple quick things since i don't have time to post a full-fledged response right now:

I guess the reason i delineate pre-empts from spikes is that "pre-empts" is what i hear used in policy at the end of a 1AC that's generally some sort of generic K answer. "spikes" is what I hear used in LD (or policy) rounds when someone is extending a one line argument that's prolly warrantless. When I say "spikes" you can just substitute "blips" in for it.

Second, i'd need to think about the whole deterrent thing in terms of why cw framework isn't super-tech and blippy, but I would say that community norms are fairly strong deterrents. If judges were to decide that a particular practice is bad for debate (like say miscutting evidence) and decide not to give people who miscut evidence higher than 25 speaks, that'd be a fairly effective deterrent. Same thing is true for the expected threshold of warrants on the fw debate on CW.

poneill wrote:
Second, i'd need to think about the whole deterrent thing in terms of why cw framework isn't super-tech and blippy, but I would say that community norms are fairly strong deterrents. If judges were to decide that a particular practice is bad for debate (like say miscutting evidence) and decide not to give people who miscut evidence higher than 25 speaks, that'd be a fairly effective deterrent. Same thing is true for the expected threshold of warrants on the fw debate on CW.

I don't think that's the solution.

A. LD judges traditionally haven't been willing to penalize debaters with low speaks. Haven't we heard a bazillion discussions recently about speak inflation in LD? It just seems unlikely that this trend will quickly change.

B. I don't think many judges would be willing to post paradigmatic rules governing their speaker point allocation! It just isn't a norm, so it is hard to believe that judges would be willing to adopt a rigid set of guidelines to decide what arguments deserve high speaks automatically or which arguments should be penalized.

Db8rBoi wrote:

I don't think that's the solution.

A. LD judges traditionally haven't been willing to penalize debaters with low speaks. Haven't we heard a bazillion discussions recently about speak inflation in LD? It just seems unlikely that this trend will quickly change.

B. I don't think many judges would be willing to post paradigmatic rules governing their speaker point allocation! It just isn't a norm, so it is hard to believe that judges would be willing to adopt a rigid set of guidelines to decide what arguments deserve high speaks automatically or which arguments should be penalized.

I mean, haven't judges decided either to not listen to A priori arguments, set a very high threshold for them, or decided to punish debaters by docking speaks for making them (or at least a fair number of judges?)? In fact, in a world where speaks are so inflated, giving someone even like a 26.5 or 27 for doing something that is agreed to be bad for debate would be a HUGE disincentive. Since the difference between even like the top 15 debaters at a tournament is only a couple of points, turning a 28 into a 26 for making blippy arguments could be devastating.

Additionally, I really just don't think you can make a moderately warranted fwork argument establishing a particular ethical claim in a short amount of time.

But more importantly, why don't debaters use "strength of warrant" as a mechanism for weighing their arguments? If I win say 2 arguments why say large scale violations of autonomy are the worst impact ever with good warrants, and you win 6 poor warrants for why say nuke war outweighs, why wouldn't I make an argument saying that my 2 warrants are stronger which means the risk associated with my impact is larger or whatever. That's another check back.